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§ 1.1. Rebuttal Testimony - Presentation as a Matter of Right. During 
its 1982 term, in Drake v. Goodman, I the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts sought to define the nature of a litigant's right to present 
rebuttal evidence2 after the close of its case-in-chief. 3 The Court held that 
the plaintiffs did not have an absolute right to present rebuttal evidence 
which in effect adopted a theory of liability not presented during the 
plaintiffs' case-in-chief.4 This section addresses the implications of the 
Court's holding in Drake. 
In Drake v. Goodman,s the minor plaintiff, Christine Drake, sought 
recovery from the defendant, her physician, for medical malpractice. 6 
The trial was ajury trial before ajudge ofthe superior court,? The plaintiff 
testified to suffering an injury to her left hand on September 12, 1977 for 
which she sought and received treatment by the defendant. 8 The defen-
dant placed a plaster cast on her arm extending from her fingers to her 
elbow.9 Three days later Drake's fingers had become swollen, blue, and 
cold. IO She returned to the defendant who removed the cast and replaced 
it with one of a different type .11 A few days later Drake's fingers began to 
"claw up," and she returned to the defendant again, who this time 
recommended an operation. 12 Drake subsequently visited another physi-
* NOEL AUGUSTYN is Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law at Boston 
College Law School. 
§ 1.1. 1386 Mass. 88, 434 N.E.2d 1211 (1982). 
2 Rebuttal evidence has been defined as "evidence given to explain, repel, counteract, or 
disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1139 
(rev. 5th ed. 1979). See also Payson v. Bombardier, Ltd., 435 A.2d 411, 413 (Me. 1981); 
Willey v. Glass, 242 Md. 156, 161, 218 A.2d 212, 216 (1966). 
3 386 Mass. at 88-93, 434 N.E.2d at 1212-14. 
4 Id. at 92-93, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
5 !d. at 88, 434 N.E.2d at 1211. 
6 Id. at 88-90, 434 N.E.2d at 1212-13. The suit was brought by Christine Drake and 
another, Albert Drake. Id. at 88, 434 N.E.2d at 1211. 
7 Id. at 88,434 N.E.2d at 1211-12. 
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cian and was admitted to a hospital during September of 1977.13 She was 
discharged after five days but was rehospitalized during October and 
November of 1977 as well as from February to June of 1978 and August of 
1980.14 Drake's hand was permanently unclenched after an operation 
during her final hospitalization, almost three years after her initial treat-
ment by the defendant. ls 
During the trial, there was considerable dispute regarding whether 
Drake's clenched hand was caused by the inappropriate. nature of her 
initial plaster cast, put on by the defendant, or whether it was caused by 
something other than the defendant's treatment of her inju~ .16 According 
to the Court, "[t]he plaintiffs' case-in-chief was based on a claim that the 
defendant's negligence in putting on a cast that was too dght and in not 
properly supervising [Drake's] treatment caused physical injuries, par-
ticularly the clenched hand." 17 The Court noted that Drake provided a 
medical witness whose testimony supported the theory that the defen-
dant's negligence caused the clenched hand. IS It also pointed out that 
another of the plaintiffs' medical witnesses testified on cross-examination 
that there was a psychological element to the problem and that the 
defendant had caused no serious physical i~ury to Drake. 19 The Court 
then observed that while evidence at trial indicated that Drake "had 
certain psychological problems," the plaintiffs had made no effort during 
their "case-in-chief to demonstrate that a negligently c~used physical 
injury caused psychological problems which in turn caused the clenched 
hand."20 The defendant's expert witnesses, according to the Court, tes-
tified that Drake's clenched hand resulted from a psychological rather 
than a physical problem and had no connection with anything done by the 
defendant. 21 
After the close of the defendant's case, Drake sought to present a 
rebuttal witness who, according to the Court, would "testify that the 
physical injury [allegedly caused by the defendant] caused a psychiatric 





17 Id. at 90, 434 N.E.2d at 1212 (emphasis added). The Court did mention in a footnote 
that the plaintiff may have raised an "emotional aspect" ofthe physical causation theory at 
trial. Id. at 93 n.5, 434 N.E.2d at 1214 n.5. The Court stated, however, that this "emotional 
aspect" did not warrant submission of the rebuttal testimony as a matter of right. Id. 
18 Id. at 89, 434 N.E.2d at 1212. 
19 Id. at 89-90, 434 N.E.2d at 1212. 
20 Id. at 90, 434 N.E.2d at 1212-13 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 90, 434 N.E.2d at 1213. 
22 /d. at 91, 434 N.E.2d at 1213. 
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rebuttal witness,23 and the jury subsequently found in favor of the defen-
dant. 24 The plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision not to allow the 
rebuttal witness and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate 
review. 25 The Court affirmed the ruling of the trial judge. 26 
The Court began its analysis of whether the trial judge erred in refusing 
to admit the plaintiffs' rebuttal testimony by acknowledging that "[a] trial 
judge has substantial discretion" in determining whether she will admit 
rebuttal evidence.27 The Court noted that the rebuttal witness' availability 
in this case was uncertain and that the evidence could have been intro-
duced as part of the plaintiffs' case-in-chief.28 Moreover, the Court ac-
knowledged that the testimony to be rebutted was known to the plaintiff 
prior to its entry into evidence and that the rebuttal testimony would have 
introduced a new theory of causation into the case.29 Based on these 
facts, the Court determined that the trial judge had not abused her broad 
discretion in choosing to disallow presentation of the rebuttal evidence. 3o 
After referring to this broad discretion, however, the Court focused on an 
alternative theory for challenging the refusal to allow Drake's rebuttal 
testimony into evidence. The Drake Court noted that there are some 
situations "in which a party may present rebuttal evidence as a matter of 
right and in which the denial of that right would be an error of law," such 
as when a party seeks to present evidence to refute evidence offered by 
the other litigant. 31 
In analyzing whether the plaintiff had a right to present the rebuttal 
evidence, which would take precedence over a discretionary ruling of the 
trial judge ,32 the Court focused on the nature of the rebuttal evidence at 
issue. The Court characterized the evidence as follows: 
It did not rebut the testimony of the defendant's experts. Instead, it ac-
cepted the existence of a psychological cause of the clenched hand and 
sought to connect the psychological condition to the injury allegedly caused 
by the defendant. Of course, the new theory contradicted the defendant's 
contention that there was no underlying physical cause of the clenched 
hand. It was, however, more the making of an affirmative case than a 
contradiction of the defendant's evidence. 33 
23Id. at 88-89, 434 N.E.2d at 1212. 
24 Id. at 88, 434 N.E.2d at 1212. 
25 Id. at 88-89 & n.2, 434 N .E.2d at 1212 & n.2. The plaintiff also appealed the lower 
court's ruling admitting into evidence testimony given by the defendant's experts. /d. at 89, 
434 N.E.2d at 1212. The Court affumed that ruling. /d. at 89, 90-91,434 N.E.2d at 1212, 
1213. The issue involved there extends beyond the scope of this section. 
26 Id. at 89, 434 N.E.2d at 1212. 
27 Id. at 92, 434 N .E.2d at 1214. 
28 Id. at 93, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
29 Id. 
30Id. at 92-94, 434 N.E.2d at 1214-15. 
31 Id. at 92, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 92-93, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
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The Court stated that where rebuttal evidence only bolst¢rs the parties' 
affirmative case, no right to present it exists.34 The Drake Court therefore 
concluded that the plaintiffs had no right to present their rebuttal evi-
dence. 35 The Court then went on to indicate that testimony regarding any 
psychological cause of the plaintiff Drake's clenched hand resulting from 
actions by the defendant more properly belonged in the plaintiffs' affirma-
tive case and should have been raised there. 36 
The holding in Drake changes the Massachusetts treatment of the right 
to present rebuttal evidence after the close of a party's case-in-chief. For 
the first time the Court has affirmatively defined the right. It has done so, 
however, in a very restrictive fashion. A study of the authority cited by 
the Court in Drake 37 makes this implication clear. 
Without explicitly so stating, the Court in Drake addressed an issue of 
Massachusetts law that has received little attention and which remains 
ambiguous, even after Drake. The issue is the extent to which a party has 
the right to present a rebuttal witness after the close of its case-in-chief. 
Prior to Drake, no Massachusetts decision had sketched the affirmative 
boundaries of the right. 38 Rather, at best, decisions mentioned the right 
only in a general manner before discussing the discretionary authority of 
the trial judge to admit or exclude rebuttal evidence where no right to 
admit is involved. 39 That Drake is the first Massachusetts case to address 
directly the affirmative boundaries of the right, separately from judicial 
discretion, becomes clear by studying the authority used by the Court as 
the basis for its decision. 
In Drake, the Court relied solely on one prior case and three evidence 
treatises.40 The prior case was the Court's 1939 decision in Common-
wealth v. Wood. 41 The issue before the Court in Wood differed greatly 
from that in Drake. Wood was a combined trial of two criminal defen-
dants.42 In Wood, the prosecutor sought to introduce against the defen-
dant Wood his own testimony obtained after the Comrponwealth had 
rested its case against him.43 The testimony was not being offered to rebut 
any evidence presented by Wood and was obtained only upon cross-
examination during the other defendant's case-in-chief.44 The trial judge 
34 /d. at 92, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
35 [d. 
36 [d. at 92-93, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
37 [d. at 92,434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 38-52. 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 38-52. 
40 386 Mass. at 92, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
41 302 Mass. 265, 19 N.E.2d 320 (1939). 
42 [d. at 266-67, 19 N.E.2d at 322. 
43 [d. at 267, 19 N.E.2d at 322. 
44 /d. 
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allowed the testimony in against Wood even though it did not rebut any 
evidence put forth by Wood, and was elicited after the Commonwealth's 
case against Wood was closed.45 The Wood Court began its analysis of the 
propriety of the trial judge's ruling by stating the rule that "[a] party who 
has rested his case has the right to introduce, later, competent evidence of 
new facts appearing in the testimony of witnesses called by the oppo-
nent."46 This language, however, is dicta in the Wood opinion. The 
evidence in question did not rebut any prior testimony and the Court 
upheld the trial judge's ruling based on the broad discretion of trial judges 
to admit "material evidence,"47 rather than on a right to present rebuttal 
evidence. Moreover, even the cases cited by the Wood Court do not 
sketch any affirmative boundaries to the right to present rebuttal evi-
dence. 
The Wood Court cited two cases as authority for the rule quoted above. 
The first case was Cobb, Bates & Yerxa, Co. v. Hills .48 The relevant issue 
in Hills was whether a party could introduce testimony to rebut other 
testimony elicited by the party during cross-examination of its opponent's 
witness.49 There the Court held that such rebuttal evidence was admissi-
ble but failed to say whether it was admissible by right or judicial discre-
tion.50 The second case cited by the Wood Court was Commonwealth v. 
Howe .51 Again, the Howe Court did not address directly the right of a 
party to introduce rebuttal testimony after the close of its case-in-chief. In 
Howe the Court held that the trial court erred in not allowing a criminal 
defendant to introduce evidence which, while not directly rebutting the 
Commonwealth's case,52 tended to establish a fact favorable to the defen-
dant. 53 There is no suggestion in the opinion, however, that the defendant 
sought to introduce the evidence after the close of his case. 54 Rather, the 
Howe Court seems to have considered only the defendant's more general 
right to introduce testimony during its affirmative case. 
Based on this direct common law authority, Drake goes beyond prior 
Massachusetts law in sketching affirmative boundaries for a litigant's right 
to introduce rebuttal testimony after the close of its case-in-chief.55 In 
45 !d. 
46 !d. 
47 Id. at 267, 19 N.E.2d at 323. 
48 208 Mass. 270, 94 N .E. 265 (1911). 
49 Id. at 272, 94 N.E. at 266. 
50 Id. 
51 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 153 (1863). 
52 Id. at 355-56. 
53 !d. at 356. 
54 See id. at 355-56. 
55 See also Vallen v. Cullen, 238 Mass. 145,330 N.E. 215 (1923). There the Court also 
mentioned the right to present rebuttal evidence without defining its exact boundaries. !d. at 
147, 330 N.E. at 217. 
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doing so, the Court cited three treatises to support its position and 
supplement the common law authority which, as discussed above, was 
not directly on point. 56 These three academic authorities all address 
directly the right to present rebuttal evidence after a party ends its 
case-in-chief.57 For example, the Court cites McCormick's treatise as 
authority for the proposition that a litigant has a right to present evidence 
in rebuttal after the close of its case if the evidence is used to refute the 
other party's evidence.58 In McCormick's terms, the rebuttal evidence 
must be "confined to testimony which is directed to refuting the evidence 
of the defendant." 59 In stating that an affirmative right to rebut testimony 
exists but that it does not extend to evidence that only supports a party's 
affirmative case, therefore, the Court was being consistent with the rule 
adopted by the commentators on the issue.6o 
While being consistent with the academic authority regarding the right 
to introduce rebuttal testimony, however, the Court construed the right 
very narrowly. In the section of Wigmore's treatise cited by the Court, 
Wigmore acknowledges that separating instances of "rebuttal" testimony 
offered to rebut new facts put in by the opponent and those where the 
rebuttal evidence merely supports the party's affirmative case is 
difficult. 61 In Drake, the Court drew this line very strictly. The Court 
recognized that the plaintiff rejected the underlying premise of the defen-
dant's argument - that Drake's clenched hand resulted in no way from 
any injury to Drake caused by the defendant. 62 Yet, the Court stated that 
the plaintiff "accepted the defendant's evidence that the clenched hand 
was not directly caused by any physical injury. "63 Here the Court seemed 
to be stressing the lack of any attempt by Drake to contradict the defen-
dant's testimony in seeking to introduce her rebuttal testimony. The 
Court therefore stated that while the plaintiff rejected the premise of the 
defendant's causation argument, she somehow accepted the defendant's 
theory of causation.64 
The Court's position on whether Drake was accepting or rejecting the 
defendant's testimony seems contradictory. It is difficult to see how the 
premise of an argument can be rejected while the argument itself is 
S6 386 Mass. at 92, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. The Court cited C. MCCORMICK, A HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 4, at 6 (2d ed. 1972); K. HUGHES, EVIDENCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE, 19 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 182 (1961); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1873 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).Id. 
57 See treatises cited supra note 56. 
58 386 Mass. at 92, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
59 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 56, at § 4, at 6. 
60 See treatises cited supra note 56. 
61 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, at § 1873, at 672. 
62 See 386 Mass. at 92-93, 434 N .E.2d at 1214. 
63 Id. at 92,434 N.E.2d at 1214 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 92-93, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
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accepted. The Court resolves this apparent contradiction by focusing 
narrowly on the issue of causation and construing strictly the plaintiff's 
case-in-chief.65 According to the Court, the plaintiff never argued that the 
defendant caused a physical injury which caused a psychological injury 
which caused the clenched fist. 66 Rather, the Court stated that the plaintiff 
argued the defendant caused a physical injury which alone caused the 
clenched fist. 67 Conversely, the defendant had argued that a psychologi-
cal injury alone, which was not caused by the defendant, resulted in the 
plaintiff's clenched fist. 68 The plaintiff's rebuttal evidence, the Court 
pointed out, was directed toward establishing that even if there were a 
psychological cause for the plaintiff's injury, it had resulted from an 
underlying physical injury caused by the defendant. 69 Such evidence, the 
Court admonished, went beyond the physical theory of causation pro-
posed by the plaintiff in her case-in-chief. 70 The Court found the plaintiff's 
rebuttal evidence to propose, in effect, a new affirmative theory of causa-
tion rather than refuting a specific fact.1 1 Therefore, although Drake 
rejected the factual premise of the defendant's position, the Court rea-
soned that no right to rebut the defendant's testimony existed because the 
conflict was one over theories of causation rather than contradictory 
facts.72 
The Court was very restrictive in its analysis of whether to admit 
rebuttal evidence as a matter of right in Drake. The Court chose to 
characterize the plaintiff's rebuttal evidence as evidence supporting a new 
theory of causation rather than as rebutting a fact put into evidence by the 
defendant. To do so, the Court had to read the plaintiff's initial "physical 
causation" theory narrowly. In effect, the Court treated the physical 
causation theory as one which excluded all factual intervening causes, or 
variations of the physical causation theory, not explicitly advanced by the 
plaintiff during its case-in-chief. Had the Court not so construed the 
plaintiff's physical causation theory, it could not have characterized the 
plaintiff's rebuttal testimony as accepting a new theory of causation. This 
65 !d. 
66 [d.; but see id. at 93 n.5, 434 N.E.2d at 1214 n.5. 
67 [d. at 90, 434 N.E.2d at 1212-13. 
68 [d. at 89-90, 434 N .E.2d at 1212. 
69 [d. at 92, 434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
70 !d. at 92-93,434 N.E.2d at 1214. 
71 !d. The Court did not address whether the factual basis of the defendant's "psychologi-
cal theory" could have been subject to attack on factual grounds under the general "physical 
theory" proposed by the plaintiff. 
72 [d. Presumably, if the plaintiff's initial physical causation theory had been broad 
enough to encompass the defendant's psychological causation theory, the conflict would 
have been over a factual issue of causation - an issue appropriate for rebuttal testimony. 
The Court never clearly addressed this issue. But see id. at 93 n.5, 434 N.E.2d at 1214 n.5. 
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result follows because had the initial physical cause theory been 
sufficiently broad to cover the defendant's psychological theory, there 
would have been no new theory for the plaintiff to accept. Without such a 
new theory, the rebuttal testimony could properly have been deemed 
evidence introduced to rebut the fact that a psychological cause unrelated 
to the defendant's actions caused the clenched fist. 
In construing the right to present rebuttal testimony narrowly, the 
Drake Court acted consistently with a restrictive trend emerging from 
other jurisdictions.73 For example, on March 18, 1982, the Appellate 
Division of New York, in Yeomans v. Warren,74 construed the right 
narrowly. The Yeomans court addressed the question of whether rebuttal 
evidence which contradicted the defendant's testimony was proper where 
the contradiction had already been "established in the evidence. "75 The 
court held that it was not proper rebuttal evidence.76 Reasoning that the 
contradictory nature of the testimony was already before the jury, the 
court stated that further demonstration of this contradiction through re-
buttal evidence was not warranted.77 Similarly, in the 1982 decision of 
Coffman v. Austgen's Electric, Inc.,78 the Court of Appeals of Indiana 
considered a challenge by a plaintiff to the exclusion at trial of rebuttal 
evidence. The plaintiff sought recovery based, inter alia, on tort strict 
liability.79 The plaintiff introduced evidence of the product's unrea-
sonably dangerous nature during its case-in-chief.80 The defendant, dur-
ing its affirmative case, presented evidence explaining that the means 
suggested by the plaintiff for making the product safe were impractical. 81 
In rebuttal, the plaintiff sought to disprove the testimony concerning such 
impracticality but was not allowed to do SO.82 The Indiana court affirmed 
the exclusion of this rebuttal evidence.83 The court held that the practical-
ity of the safety device should have been introduced during the plaintiff's 
case-in-chief and that it was inappropriate in rebuttal because it did not 
address specifically the defendant's knowledge of practicality. 84 The evi-
dence went to the issue of practicality more generally. 85 Finally, the 
73 See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text; but see Pellico v. E.L. Ramm Co., 68 Ill. 
App.2d 332, 216 N .E.2d 258, 261 (1966). 
74 87 A.D.2d 713, 448 N. Y.S.2d 889 (1982). 
75 [d. at 713,448 N.Y.S.2d at 890. 
76 [d. at 713, 448 N.Y,S.2d at 890-91. 
77 [d. 
78 437 N.E.2d 1003 (Ind. App. 1982). 
79 [d. at 1004-05. 
80 [d. at 1005. 
81 [d. 
82 Id. 




Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/4
§ 1.1 EVIDENCE 9 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine adopted a restrictive attitude toward the 
right to present rebuttal testimony in Payson v. Bombardier, Ltd.,86 
decided on October 8, 1981. The court upheld the exclusion of rebuttal 
evidence which the plaintiff sought to introduce on the issue of design 
defect in a product's liability action.87 The evidence related to the fact of 
notice, the defendant having testified to receiving no notice.88 The court 
held that the evidence was properly excludable because it did not address 
the specific type of notice which the defendant claimed not to have.89 
The factual basis and legal issues in these three decisions differ from the 
facts and issues in Drake. The decisions show in a general way, however, 
that Drake's restrictive approach to presenting rebuttal testimony is not 
isolated. Rather, the Court in Drake seems to have begun defining the 
right to present rebuttal testimony in a way consistent with the restrictive 
trend of other jurisdictions. Whether following the trend of these jurisdic-
tions is desirable raises a separate set of issues. 
As Wigmore points out, the orderly progression of a trial requires the 
plaintiff to present its entire substantive case during its case-in-chief.90 
Yet, unduly restricting the use of rebuttal testimony under this principle 
can have negative consequences as well. The specific holding in Drake, 
addressing causation in a negligence action, arguably has two such con-
sequences. 
First, Drake invites defendants to present frivolous defenses. A defen-
dant after Drake is encouraged to propose weak defenses based on theo-
ries of causation differing from that asserted by the plaintiff, rather than 
directly addressing the plaintiff's claims. Defendants are so encouraged 
because raising such defenses puts plaintiffs in a difficult position. A 
plaintiff must either address the alternative theory, or variation of an 
already considered theory, of liability in its case-in-chief or run the risk of 
being unable to rebut the factual basis of alternative theories if they are 
raised by the defendant after the plaintiff's case is closed. This risk arises 
from the possibility that the court might construe the plaintiff's initial 
theory of liability in a way which does not include any variation of that 
theory. If the court does construe the plaintiff's initial theory in such a 
manner, it is then free to reject the plaintiff's rebuttal testimony of the 
defendant's facts by holding that the plaintiff is actually adopting a new 
affirmative theory of liability rather than rebutting the defendant's facts. 
Although addressing such alternative theories or variations of theories 
during a plaintiff's case-in-chief is not necessarily a problem, this re-
quirement could nevertheless be troublesome in ajury trial. For example, 
86 435 A.2d 411 (Me. 1981). 
87 Id. at 411. 
88 Id. at 412-14. 
89 Id. at 413-14. 
90 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, at § 1873, at 672. 
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the plaintiff's efforts to address several theories of liability may confuse 
the jury. Moreover, the jury may feel that the plaintiff is being abrasive in 
addressing so many issues if later the defendant decides to address only 
the main theory of liability. In the alternative, if all possible theories or 
varieties of liability theories are not addressed by the plaintiff in its 
case-in-chief, the defendant might be able to raise them later, even ifthey 
are spurious, to confuse the jury without the plaintiff being able to rebut 
them. This lopsided result seems to disadvantage plaintiffs unnecessarily. 
The second problem with the Drake decision is one of judicial econ-
omy. While the Drake holding is apparently based in part on judicial 
economy,91 the decision seems instead to frustrate it. Plaintiffs must raise 
all possible theories of liability and variations of theories presented, even 
when they are weak and the defendant does not address them later, to be 
protected against the subsequent judicial admonition that issues should 
have been raised during the case-in-chief. The practical result of this 
situation is the use of court time and other resources on issues which 
might not need litigation. Such a waste of judicial and other resources 
seems particularly unfortunate in this era of clogged court calendars. 
Clearly, an unlimited right to reopen one's case-in-chief would more 
severely hinder judicial efficiency than would placing the heavy burden on 
plaintiffs to address all possible facts and theories during its affirmative 
case. Yet, this problem of unlimited abusive reopening could be curbed 
without unnecessarily increasing the plaintiff's burden. The courts could 
define the right to rebut using a case-by-case approach, ~nd in a manner 
less strict than that required by Drake. 
In addition to these two problems of trial procedure, the Drake decision 
has a conceptual ambiguity that will serve to undermine a clear definition 
of the right to present rebuttal evidence. The ambiguity arises from the 
Court's standard for determining whether rebuttal evidence is admissible 
by right. The Court's standard rests on the difference be~ween evidence 
establishing a new affirmative legal theory and evidence establishing a fact 
contradicting the other party's evidence. Where rebuttal evidence is di-
rected toward establishing a new affirmative legal theory - in Drake, a 
theory of causation - it is not admissible by right. Unfurtunately, the 
difference between evidence bearing on a legal theory and that bearing on 
a fact is not always clear. While facts and legal theories are conceptually 
distinct, they can become difficult to distinguish. A party establishes the 
validity of a legal theory only by establishing facts sufficient to sustain it. 
Moreover, a fact is admissible only if relevant to a legal theory presented 
by a party. Therefore, determining whether rebuttal evidence addresses a 
91 See 386 Mass. at 91-92,434 N.E.2d at 1213 (mentioning possibility of surrebuttal where 
rebuttal is allowed); id. at 93, 434 N.E.2d at 1214 (discussing delays which would have 
occurred in allowing the plaintiff to present rebuttal testimony). 
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fact contradicting the other party's evidence rather than a new, affirma-
tive legal theory is very difficult. The evidence serves both purposes. In 
trying to follow Drake, however, trial judges and parties will have to 
engage constantly in this ambiguous analysis. The result can only be to 
leave ill-defined the boundaries of a party's right to present rebuttal 
evidence after closing its case-in-chief. The Court might have put the 
issue on a more solid footing if it had avoided this sort of analysis 
completely. Instead, the Court should have tied its holding more spe-
cifically to the evidentiary facts, rather than legal theory analysis. 
Regardless of the procedural problems likely to arise from Drake and 
the conceptual ambiguity of the Court's standard, Drake is now the law in 
Massachusetts. Practicing attorneys therefore must be attentive to its 
strict requirements. Compliance with Drake can be assured by following 
two rules. First, all legal theories, variations of legal theories and facts 
which are related in any way to the case and which are admissible during a 
case-in-chief should be presented at that time. This suggestion applies 
even where there is some risk of confusing a jury. Failure to raise all 
issues and facts might lead the opposing party to raise them, without any 
subsequent opportunity for the first party to rebut. Second, all rebuttal 
evidence should stress the precise parts of the opposition's case which are 
being refuted. In this way one can avoid the appearance of accepting the 
opposition's theory and trying to use rebuttal testimony to fashion a new 
counter-theory around it. Such an appearance would surely be fatal under 
the Drake Court's analysis. 
In Drake v. Goodman the Court began defining the substanti ve limits of 
a party's right to present rebuttal testimony after the close of its case-in-
chief. The Court held that the right does not extend to rebuttal evidence 
which accepts a theory of liability raised by a party's opponent when the 
theory was not included as part of the rebutting party's case-in-chief. In 
so holding, the Court went beyond prior Massachusetts decisions on the 
issue. Moreover, the Drake Court acted consistently with a modern trend 
of significantly restricting the right to present rebuttal evidence. This 
alignment with the restrictive trend means that the Court is likely to look 
unfavorably upon efforts by litigants to exercise the right to present 
rebuttal in the future. Therefore, parties should present all evidence 
related in any way to the case during the case-in-chief, even if the 
evidence only anticipates an opponent's argument. This need to avoid 
relying on rebuttal for presentation of evidence is compounded by the 
ambiguous standard established by the Drake Court for applying the right 
to rebut evidence. The Court drew a line between evidence submitted in 
support of a new, affirmative legal theory and that in support of a legal fact 
which contradicts the other party's evidence. Yet, the meaning of such a 
standard is far from clear. In any event, the Court has begun addressing 
an ill-defined area of evidence law and is likely to return to it for further 
clarification in the future. 
11
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§ 1.2. Consciousness of Guilt in Flight. A long established common law 
doctrine is that evidence of the flight of one accused of a crime is admissi-
ble as proof of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. I The assumptions 
underlying this doctrine, however, have not escaped judicial criticism. 2 
Two cases discussing this evidentiary rule in Massachu~etts during the 
Survey year were Commonwealth v. Toney 3 and Commonwealth v. 
Booker.4 
Toney was a murder case where the defense was that of mistaken 
identity.5 One of the issues involved evidence of flight. 6 The prosecutor 
introduced evidence at trial to show that law enforcement officers had 
unsuccessfully tried to locate the defendant by telephoning and visiting 
her house on several occasions after the murder in question. 7 The defen-
dant introduced evidence that she would have been at work during the 
times the police came to her house and that she had no knowledge that the 
police were looking for her.8 The prosecution then offereq proof suggest-
ing that the defendant also failed to report for work after the murder.9 
The defendant did not challenge the principle that evidence of flight is 
admissible to prove consciousness of guilt. 10 Rather, the defendant con-
tended that in the instant case the evidence lacked probative value since 
there was no proof that she actually knew of the efforts by the police to 
find her until just prior to surrendering herself to the authorities .11 More-
over, the defendant appeared to argue that the prosecution was required 
to make a preliminary showing that she was in fact absent from her usual 
environs before the proffered evidence could be admittedY 
The Court accepted neither contention, holding that evidence of flight 
may be probative of consciousness of guilt regardless of whether a defen-
dant has actual knowledge that she is being sought by the police and that, 
in any event, the evidence was sufficient here to permit an inference of 
such knowledge by the defendant. 13 As to the "absence in fact" argu-
ment, the Court held that it was sufficient for the prosecution to demon-
§ 1.2. 1 See C. MCCORMICK, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 271 (2d ed. 
1972). 
2 Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 585 & n.5, 433 N.E.2d 425, 431-32 & n.5 
(1982). 
3 385 Mass. 575, 433 N.E.2d 425 (1982). 
4 386 Mass. 466, 436 N.E.2d 160 (1982). 
5 385 Mass. at 577, 433 N .E.2d at 427-28. 
6/d. at 582-85, 433 N.E.2d at 430-32. 
7 [d. at 582, 433 N.E.2d at 430-3\. 
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strate that the defendant was not at her home or at work during the two 
week period following the murder. 14 The Court stated that the defendant 
could offer evidence in rebuttal, and that it was for the jury to determine 
which evidence was most credible .15 
The defendant also raised an issue never fully addressed by the Court 
previously: whether the trial judge must, in his instructions to the jury on 
evidence of flight, call to the jurors' attention the defendant's innocent 
explanation for the alleged flight. 16 In examining this issue the court 
analyzed the "evidence of flight" principle, noting its two basic assump-
tions. 17 The first assumption, the Court stated, is that the person who flees 
after a criminal act has been committed does so becalise he feels guilt 
concerning the act. IS The second assumption, the Court continued, is that 
one who feels guilt concerning an act has committed that act. 19 The Toney 
Court noted that both of these assumptions. have been questioned and 
criticized by various courtS.20 After considering these assumptions and 
their possible shortcomings, the Toney Court stated that in its opinion a 
trial judge should instruct a jury on this matter as follows: (1) the defen-
dant should not be convicted on the basis of evidence of flight or conceal-
ment alone, and (2) the jury may, but need not, consider such evidence as 
one of the factors tending to prove the defendant's guilt. 21 The Court 
reached the conclusion that the decision whether to call the jury's atten-
tion to the defendant's innocent explanation for the alleged flight was a 
matter for the trial judge's discretion. 22 Under the facts of Toney, the 
Court ruled that the instructions given to the jury by the trial judge were 
sufficient to indicate tlie "equivocal nature of evidence of flight," and 
therefore, there was no error in those instructions.23 
In Commonwealth v. Booker,24 an armed robbery case, the defendant 
also argued that evidence of flight presented by the prosecution had little, 
if any, probative value. 25 The prosecutor in Booker, over the defendant's 
objection, offered evidence that the defendant was hiding in a closet in his 
home when police came to arrest him a day after the robbery.26 As in 
14 Id. at 583-84, 433 N .E.2d at 431. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 584, 433 N.E.2d at 431. 
17 Id. at 584-85, 433 N.E.2d at 431-32. 
18 Id. at 584, 433 N.E.2d at 432. 
19 Id. at 585, 433 N.E.2d at 432. 
20 /d. at 585 & n.5, 433 N.E.2d at 432 & n.5. 
21 Id. at 585. 433 N.E.2d at 432. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 585 & n.6, 433 N.E.2d at 432 & n.6. 
24 386 Mass. 466. 436 N.E.2d 160 (1982). 
25 Id. at 468, 436 N.E.2d at 162. 
26 /d. 
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Toney,27 the defendant conceded the general principle tnat evidence of 
flight is admissible as some evidence of consciousness of guilt. 28 In this 
particular case, however, the defendant argued that the "flight as con-
sciousness of guilt" doctrine was inapplicable, because his flight might 
not have been at all related to the armed robbery for i which he was 
currently being tried, but rather may have only shown cdnsciousness of 
guilt for an earlier crime for which a default warrant on the defendant was 
outstanding. 29 In addressing the defendant's assertions, the Court noted 
that the "[t]est of relevancy is a 'matter on which the opinion of the trial 
judge will be accepted on review except for palpable error.! "30 The Court 
determined that the admission of the flight evidence was properly within 
the trial judge's discretion in this case because the jury "could have found 
that the defendant sought to hide ... because of his consciousness of guilt 
ofthe armed robbery that occurred the night before," especially when the 
outstanding default warrant on the earlier offense was more than fifteen 
months 01d.31 The Court also noted the prejudicial effect of having the 
defendant reveal a past crime in giving an alternate explanation for his 
flight.32 The Court concluded, however, that "evidence that tends to 
show consciousness of guilt is relevant and is not rendered inadmissible 
simply because it may indicate that the defendant has committed another 
offense." 33 The Court distinguished Booker from a federal case34 where 
evidence of a defendant's flight after a second robbery was excluded from 
his trial for the first robbery because such evidence was not probative of 
consciousness of guilt related to the first robbery. 35 In Booker, the Court 
noted, the defendant was on trial for his most recent offense, and his prior 
offense occurred more than fifteen months before his flight,36 Under those 
circumstances the Court concluded that the flight evidence was 
sufficiently probative of consciousness of guilt for the crime the defendant 
was currently being tried forY 
Finally, Booker, like Toney,38 involved the issue of ~he trial court's 
instruction to the jury on "flight as consciousness of guilt" evidence. In 
27 385 Mass. at 583, 433 N .E.2d at 431. 
28 386 Mass. at 469, 436 N.E.2d at 162. 
29 [d. 
30 [d. at 470, 436 N.E.2d at 163 (quoting Commonwealth v. Young. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
280, 295, 416 N .E.2d 944, 953). 
31 /d. 
32 [d. at 471, 436 N.E.2d at 163. 
33 [d. 
34 United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd after remand, 572 F.2d 506 
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978). 
35 386 Mass. at 471. 436 N.E.2d at 164. 
36 [d. 
37 [d. 
38 385 Mass. at 583-85, 433 N.E.2d at 431-32. 
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Booker, the defense counsel cautioned the jury against placing too much 
weight on the evidence of defendant's "flight."39 The prosecutor, how-
ever, did not mention the evidence in his closing, and the judge charged 
the jury without either referring to that evidence or instructing the jury on 
consciousness of guilt.40 At the trial, the defendant made no objection to 
the charge.41 In light of these facts, the Court in Booker concluded, "if the 
defendant wanted the judge to provide limiting or curative instructions, he 
should have made the proper request. Ordinarily judges are not required, 
sua sponte, to instruct the juries as to the purposes for which evidence is 
offered at trial. "42 The Court cited Toney as a but see authority. 43 
In the Booker decision, the Court appears to dilute even further its 
rather weakly worded suggestion in Toney that judicial instruction be 
given concerning evidence of flight. Considering Booker, defense counsel 
would be well advised to request instructions on flight evidence if they are 
desired, and to object if such a request is not complied with by the trial 
judge. Put another way, Toney can be read in light of Booker as meaning 
only that whenever a trial court comments to the jury at all upon evidence 
of flight, it should follow the Toney Court's suggestion. Apparently, a 
total absence of instructions to the jury on admitted evidence of flight will 
be equally acceptable whenever defense counsel fails to preserve his 
rights by requesting such instructions at trial. 
§ 1.3. Hearsay - Prior Reported Testimony and Witness Unavailability. 
When a witness is unavailable to testify at a trial where his testimony is 
necessary to a fair adjudication of the issues, his testimony on those 
issues from aprevious trial or hearing may become, depending on circum-
stances of reliability, 1 admissible evidence as an exception to the hearsay 
rule.2 This hearsay exception, known as "prior reported testimony," or 
simply "former testimony," has long been recognized in other jurisdic-
tions3 and is now codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.4 As noted 
above, however, the witness' unavailability is a prerequisite to the use of 
this hearsay exception. During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. 
39 386 Mass. at 468, 436 N .E.2d at 162. 
40 /d. 
41 [d. 
42 [d. at 471-72, 436 N.E.2d at 164 (quoting Commonwealth v. Roberts, 378 Mass. 116, 
126, 389 N.E.2d 989, 996 (1979». 
43 /d. at 472, 436 N .E.2d at 164. 
§ 1.3. I See infra note 48. 
2 See C. MCCORMICK, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 254-61 (2d ed. 
1972). 
3 See id. at § 254 (cases listed in nn.2 and 3). 
4 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
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Bohannon ,5 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered as an 
issue of first impression the burden upon the prosecution in a criminal trial 
in demonstrating the unavailability of a witness prior to introducing the 
"prior reported testimony" of that witness. 6 
Bohannon involved, inter alia, the crime of rape.7 The defendant was 
convicted at a first trial, where the court refused to permit defense counsel 
on cross-examination to ask the witness complainant whether she had, on 
previous occasions, made false accusations that other men had raped 
her.8 Recognizing that the complainant's credibility was the critical issue 
in the case, the Supreme Judicial Court on appeal held that the trial 
court's ruling violated the defendant's right to present a full defense, and 
remanded for a new trial.9 
Thirteen months prior to the second trial the prosec~tion sought to 
secure the presence of the complainant, who had moved to Florida, 
through what the Court referred to as the "uniform act to secure the 
attendance of out-of-state witnesses." 10 Citing "undue hardship" as a 
reason, a Florida judge refused to compel her attendance at the trial in 
Massachusetts. I I The prosecution subsequently moved that the com-
plainant be declared an unavailable witness, hoping thereby to secure the 
use of the stenographic transcript of her testimony at the first trial as a 
substitute for her live testimony at the second trialY The motion judge 
ruled that the complainant was indeed "unavailable," but denied the 
prosecution's motion to use the transcript from the first trial. 13 He em-
phasized the defendant's lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the 
complainant at the first trial in support of his ruling. 14 
Approximately eight months later, the prosecution secured a tape cas-
sette of the complainant's testimony from the probable cause hearing, 
wherein she was subject to cross-examination including the line of ques-
tioning precluded at the first trial, and moved that this tape cassette be 
admitted in evidence in the absence of the live witnessY The defendant 
moved to suppress the tape, arguing, among other things! that complain-
ant was not an unavailable witness and that admission of the tape would 
5 385 Mass. 733, 434 N .E.2d 163 (1982). 
6 [d. at 740, 742-46, 434 N.E.2d at 168"71. 
7 [d. at 734-37, 434 N.E.2d at 164-66. 
8 [d. at 737, 434 N.E.2d at 166. 
9 [d. 
10 [d. The "uniform act" referred to by the Court is codified at G.L. c. 233, § I3B. 
" 385 Mass. at 738, 434 N.E.2d at 166. 
12 [d. 
13 /d. 
14 [d. at 738 n.4, 434 N.E.2d at 166 n.4. 
15 [d. at 738, 434 N.E.2d at 167. 
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violate defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. 16 The second 
motion judge ruled in favor of the prosecution, having "adopted" the 
ruling of the first motion judge, made eight months earlier, that the 
witness was unavailableY Moreover, the second motionjudge concluded 
that the tape was sufficiently reliable and comprehensible for the jury to 
decide the issue of credibility.18 Accordingly, the tape-recording of the 
complainant's testimony from the probable cause hearing was admitted 
into evidence at the second trial. I9 The defendant was convicted at the 
second trial and appealed. 20 
The Supreme Judicial Court again reversed the conviction, citing the 
admission of the tape of the complainant's former testimony as an error of 
constitutional magnitude.21 Relying pn Massachusetts and federal au-
thorities, the Court stated that "prior reported testimony is admissible 
only when it is established that (a) the witness is 'unavailable' to testify at 
the trial, and (b) the prior testimony is reliable."22 The Court held that in 
this case the prosecution had not adequately demonstrated the witness' 
unavailability.23 
The Court first noted the overlapping relationship between a criminal 
defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him and the 
hearsay rules, as well as the occasional conflicts between hearsay excep-
tions and this confrontational right. 24 The Court noted that the sixth 
amendment establishes, at the very minimum, a rule of "necessity. "25 
Therefore, the Court indicated, while former testimony may be intro-
duced at a criminal trial when the defendant had an opportunity to fully 
cross-examine the witness at the previous hearing, and when the witness 
is unavailable at the trial, the prosecution must, in the first instance, 
demonstrate the necessity of using such former testimony because of the 
unavailability of that witness. 26 
The Court found no such demonstration by the prosecution in Bohan-
non.27 The Court stated that the burden placed upon the Commonwealth 
in establishing the unavailability of a witness in a criminal trial is greater 
than that imposed in other situations because of the criminal defendant's 
16 Id. at 738-39, 434 N.E.2d at 167. 
17 Id. at 739, 434 N.E.2d at 167. 
18 Id. at 739-40, 434 N.E.2d at 167. 
19Id. 
20 /d. at 734, 434 N.E.2d at 165. 
21 Id. at 735, 434 N.E.2d at 165. 
22 Id. at 741,434 N.E.2d at Hi8. 
23 Id. at 745-46, 434 N.E.2d at 171. 
24 Id. at 741, 434 N.E.2d at 168. 
25 Id. at 741-42, 434 N.E.2d at 168-69. 
26 Id. at 742, 434 N.E.2d at 169. 
27 Id. at 744-46, 434 N.E.2d at 170-71. 
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competing confrontational right.28 The Court noted that resort to section 
13B of chapter 233 by the prosecution to secure a witness and the subse-
quent failure to so secure that witness may be the basi~ for a finding of 
unavailability.29 The Court also made it clear, however, that a diligent, 
good-faith effort by the prosecution to produce the witness must continue 
until a time reasonably proximate to the actual trial date. 30. In this particu-
lar case the Court found that the prosecution failed to carty its burden of 
proving that the witness was unavailable to testify at the time of the 
trial. 31 The Court ruled that the second motion judge had abused his 
discretion in relying on a finding of "unavailability" mj;lde by another 
judge eight months previously. 32 The Court also determined that the trial 
judge erred in relying on the Florida judge's ruling made in the Uniform 
Act proceedings some thirteen months earlier that it would be an undue 
hardship to compel the attendence of the complainant as Ii witness at the 
trial,33 Hence, the Court concluded that the requirement of "unavailabil-
ity" was not met in Bohannon, and the admission of the tape of the 
complainant's former testimomy was reversible error. 34 
Another case involving prior testimony and witness unavailability re-
ported later in the Survey year was Commonwealth v. Furtick. 35 Furtick 
was an armed robbery case.36 At the probable cause heari~g one witness, 
Orville Johnson, testified that he was not sure whethe~ the defendant 
committed the robbery,37 Johnson also testified at this hearing that he and 
his family had been threatened, thus implying that this ililtimidation was 
the cause of his inability to positively identify the defendant as the person 
who committed the robbery. 38 . 
At trial, another witness, the investigating detective, testified that 
Johnson had identified the defendant as the robber at the probable cause 
hearing. 39 Despite the apparent inaccuracy of this testimony, defense 
counsel did not object to it.40 It was expected that Johnson himself would 
subsequently testify at trial as well.41 Johnson, however, in fact failed to 
appear as a witness, whereupon the defendant moved to ~trike the detec-
28 [d. at 745, 434 N.E.2d at 170. 
29 [d. at 743, 434 N.E.2d at 169. 
30 [d. at 744-45, 434 N.E.2d at 170. 
3\ [d. at 745-46, 434 N.E.2d at 171. 
32 [d. at 744, 434 N.E.2d at 170. 
33 [d. 
34 See id. at 752, 434 N.E.2d at 174. 
35 386 Mass. 477, 436 N.E.2d 396 (1982). 
36 [d. at 477, 436 N.E.2d at 397. 
37 [d. at 478, 436 N.E.2d at 397. 
38 [d. 
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tive's testimony concerning Johnson's prior testimony at the probable 
cause hearing.42 The trial court denied the request, and the defendant then 
objected on the ground that allowing the detective's testimony at trial 
concerning Johnson's supposed identification of the defendant at the 
probable cause hearing to remain in evidence constituted a violation of the 
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.43 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the defendant, concluding that 
the content of Johnson's prior testimony had not been properly intro-
duced at trial.44 The Court noted that the first requirement for the legiti-
mate use of prior testimony, witness unavailability, had not been met. 45 
Citing Bohannon, the Court stated: 
The concept of "unavailability" ... concerns more than the mere absence 
of the witness. To have justified admission at trial of Johnson's identification 
of the defendant at the probable cause hearing, the Commonwealth would 
have had to prove that it made a good faith, although unsuccessful, effort to 
obtain Johnson's presence at trial. The record does not establish Johnson's 
"unavailability" in this sense.46 
The Court ruled that defendant's motion to strike the detective's tes-
timony should have been granted and therefore the Court reversed the 
lower court's judgment and set aside the verdict. 47 
In both Furtick and Bohannon the Court made it clear that witness 
unavailability means more than the simple fact that the witness is not 
present to testify at trial. This will be especially true in criminal trials, 
where the defendant enjoys the constitutional right to confront adverse 
witnesses. In order for such an adverse witness to be deemed "unavail-
able" by the trial court, the prosecution will be required to show that it 
has made a recent andgoodfaith effort to obtain the witness' presence at 
trial. Absent this threshhold showing of diligence,48 the "prior recorded 
testimony" exception to the hearsay rule will not apply. 
§ 1.4. Hearsay - Hospital Records Exception. A traditional exception to 
the hearsay rule provides for the admission of regularly kept business 
records,! among which are included hospital records.2 Massachusetts has 
42 ld. 
43 ld. at 479-80, 436 N.E.2d at 398. 
44 ld. at 480-83,436 N.E.2d at 398-400. 
45 ld. at 480, 436 N.E.2d at 398. 
46 ld. (citations omitted). 
47 ld. at 482-83, 436 N.E.2d at 400. 
48 Establishing the witness' unavailability is only the first step in gaining the admission of 
his prior reported testimony at trial. In addition, the reliability of the prior testimony must be 
demonstrated before this hearsay exception may be used. See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 
385 Mass. 733, 746-49, 434 N.E.2d 163, 171-72 (1982). 
§ 1.4. 1 See C. MCCORMICK, A HAND!lOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 304-14 
(2d ed. 1972). 
2 See id. at § 313. 
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codified the hospital records exception in chapter 233, section 79 of its 
General Laws.3 During the Survey year, the Appeals Court interpreted 
this provision in the case of Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Company.4 piaz involved a 
tort action where the plaintiff claimed to have suffered tilindness due to 
his use of the defendant's toxic agent in spraying roses.s The sole issue on 
appeal concerned the trial court's jury instruction that op~nions and diag-
noses contained in the plaintiff's hospital record could nqt be considered 
as independent evidence that the plaintiff's condition was caused by a 
toxic agent. 6 The Appeals Court found no error in the trial judge 's instruc-
tion, holding that because the diagnoses were not routiqe and involved 
serious difficulties of interpretation, they did not possess the indicia of 
reliability necessary to justify the admission of hearsay statements under 
the hospital records exception.7 
3 G.L. c. 233, § 79 provides that: 
Records kept by hospitals, dispensaries or clinics, and sanatoma under section 
seventy of chapter one hundred and eleven shall be admissible, and records which the 
court finds are required to be kept by the laws of any other state or territory, or the 
District of Columbia, or by the laws and regulations of the United States of America 
pertaining to the department of national defense and the veterans administration, by 
hospitals, dispensaries or clinics, and sanatoria similarly conduct~d or operated or 
which, being incorporated, offer treatment free of charge, may be admitted by the 
court, in its discretion as evidence in the courts of the commonwealth so far as such 
records relate to the treatment and medical history of such cases a~d the court may, 
in its discretion, admit copies of such records, if certified by the p¢rsons in custody 
thereof to be true and complete; but nothing therein contained shall be admissible as 
evidence which has reference to the question of liability. Copies of photographic or 
microphotographic records so kept by hospitals, dispensaries or clir)ics, or sanatoria, 
when duly certified by the person in charge of the hospital, dispeqsary or clinic, or 
sanatorium, shall be admitted in evidence equally with the original photographs or 
microphotographs. 
A record kept by any hospital, dispensary or clinic, or sanatori\lm under section 
seventy of chapter one hundred and eleven which is required to be produced in court 
by any party shall be certified by the affidavit of the person in custody thereof to be a 
true and complete record, and shall be delivered by such hospital, dispensary or 
clinic, or sanatorium to the clerk of such court, who shall keep the same in his 
custody until its production is called for at the trial or hearing by the party requiring 
the said record. Such record, so certified and delivered shall be deemed to be 
sufficiently identified to be admissible in evidence if admissible in all other respects. 
The party requiring the production of said record and, in the discretion of the court, 
any other party may examine said record in the custody of the clerk at any time before 
it is produced in court. The clerk upon completion of such trial or hearing shall notify 
such hospital that said record is no longer required and will be returned to the hospital 
by certified mail unless an authorized representative ofthe hospital calls for the same 
at the office of said clerk within seven days of said notice. 
4 14 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 440 N.E.2d 518 (1982). 
5 ld. at 448-49, 440 N.E.2d at 519. 
6 /d. at 449, 440 N.E.2d at 519. 
7 /d. 
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In analyzing section 79, the court noted that the admissibility of hospital 
records, "so fat as such records relate to the treatment and medical 
history" of the patient, was based on a presumption of reliability. 8 The 
court recognized that it was this presumption of reliability which justified 
not calling numerous hospital personnel as witnesses.9 The court noted, 
however, that when this presumption was negated by the facts of a given 
case, no such justification for the admission of hearsay would exist. 10 In 
Diaz, the court concluded that the diagnoses in the plaintiff's hospital 
record did not possess the indicia of reliability found in "routine observa-
tions by hospital personnel or in conclusions on which there is a consen-
sus among skilled physicians." II The observations concerning the plain-
tiff's condition were not routine, the Diaz court noted, nor was there any 
consensus among physicians concerning the cause of plaintiff's blind-
ness. 12 The court indicated that the information contained in the medical 
record at issue in Diaz was to some degree speculative, and stated that 
"where diagnoses are more judgmental, and hence controversial, cross-
examination becomes more important."13 The court then cited, rather 
comprehensively, authorities establishing the distinction between diag-
noses which are "routine" and those "which involve difficulties of in-
terpretation." 14 Because the Diaz court found that the diagnosis con-
tained in the medical record at issue fell into the latter category, IS any 
presumption of reliability was effectively nullified, and the court held 
there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in limiting the expert 
testimony to be considered by the jury to the witnesses who testified at 
trial. 16 
The hospital records hearsay exception was also briefly treated by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Bohannon,17 In Bohannon, 
8 [d. at 450, 440 N.E.2d at 520 (citing Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527-28, 381 
N.E.2d 1295, 1298 (1978». 
• [d. 
1U [d. at 450-51, 440 N.E.2d at 520. 
11 [d. at 452, 440 N.E.2d at 520-21. 
12 See id. at 451-52, 440 N.E.2d at 521. 
13 [d. at 452, 440 N.E.2d at 521. Out of co uri statements such as a hospital record are of 
course not subject to cross-examination. 
14 [d. at 453-55, 440 N.E.2d at 521-22. 
IS [d. at 451-52,440 N.E.2d at 520-21. While the reliability issue was decisive, the Court 
also referred to a proviso in chapter 232, section 79 which states that nothing contained in a 
medical record which refers to the question of liability will be admissible. [d. at 455, 440 
N.E.2d at 522. The Court indicated that diagnosis in the medical record at issue was indeed a 
conclusion of a sort on the ultimate issue of liability, and that the trial judge could properly 
consider that content in ruling on the admissibility of the medical record. [d. 
16 [d. at 452, 440 N.E.2d at 521. 
17 385 Mass. 733, 434 N.E.2d 163 (1982). Commonwealth 1'. Bohannon is also discussed in 
section 3 of this chapter. 
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the defendant offered the complainant's hospital records pursuant to 
section 79 as extrinsic evidence to prove her prior false allegations of 
rape,1s These records, the defendant contended, were relevant to the 
issue of consent in the case at hand. 19 The Bohannon Court found that the 
information contained in these particular records was not derived from 
the personal knowledge of the physician or the patient, and was simply 
too unreliable to qualify for admission under section 79.20 In other words, 
because the presumption of reliability was effectively rebutted on these 
facts, the records were inadmissible hearsay. Moreover, the Court noted, 
there was no showing by the defendant that the excluded statements were 
even related to the complainant's diagnosis or treatment as is required for 
their admission under section 79.21 
In summary, while hospital records may customarily fall within a tradi-
tional exception to the hearsay rule, "[n]ot everything contained in hospi-
tal records is admissible .... "22 The rule codified in chapter 233, section 
79 of the General Laws relies upon a presumption of relfability. Where 
reliability is in doubt, this exception to the hearsay ruk will not apply. 
18 See id. at 749, 434 N.E.2d at 173. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. at 750, 434 N.E.2d at 173. 
21 Id. 
22 Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 450, 440 N.E.2d518, 520 (1982). 
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